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"SYNTHETIC SANITY":" THE ETHICS AND
LEGALITY OF USING PSYCHOTROPIC
MEDICATIONS TO RENDER DEATH ROW
INMATES COMPETENT FOR EXECUTION
Kacie McCoy Daugherty*
INTRODUCTION
Louisiana death row inmate Michael Owen Perry, who was convicted
of killing five family members, is a diagnosed schizophrenic.' Mr. Perry
once stated that "pop singer Olivia Newton-John is a goddess living under
Lake Arthur. 2 On another occasion, he shaved his eyebrows, with the
intention of getting more oxygen to his brain.' Mr. Perry was ordered by
a Louisiana District Court judge to take the drug Haldol to render him
sane enough to understand that he was going to be executed.4 The
Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently overruled the District Court's
order, leaving Mr. Perry medically untreated and still severely psychotic.'
He remains on death row, but is not likely to be executed because he is
unlikely to regain competency without the aid of psychotropic
medications.6
Horace Edward Kelly, a death row inmate in California, believed "he
* J.D. Candidate 2001, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America; M.A. Candidate, School of Psychology, The Catholic University of
America; B.S. 1998, Mount Saint Mary's College. The author thanks Prof.
Richard Dieter for his guidance and perspective and classmates, family and
friends for their support and comments throughout this process.
1. Schizophrenia is defined as a disorder characterized by two or more of the
following symptoms, each present for a significant portion of time during a one
month period : (1) delusions; (2) hallucinations; (3) disorganized speech; (4)
grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior; (5) negative symptoms, i.e. flat affect,
alogia, or avolition. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders IV-TR. 312 (4 th ed. 2000)[hereinafter Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV-TR].
2. Competency of Killer questioned in Arkansas, Drugs Make him Sane,
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could talk to animals and at times believed he was an animal, ate dog
food, ate meals in a tree where he sat and howled.",7 Mr. Kelly is still
involved in a competency trial to determine whether he is competent to
8be executed. If found incompetent, he will be sent to a mental hospital
where doctors will face the ethical dilemma of whether or not to forcibly
treat him with psychotropic medications.9
Claude Eric Maturana, an Arizona death row inmate, was described as
speaking "so much gibberish" that his attorney could not communicate
with him.10  Mr. Maturana's doctors are providing him with daily
medications, which maintain his condition, but they refuse to participate
in the restoration of his competency so that he may be executed."
These three men represent a specific population of death row inmates:
those who suffer from debilitating mental illnesses, which may render
them incompetent to understand their fate on death row. These men were
all sentenced to die after being determined competent to stand trial and
sentencing. They became incompetent after sentencing, while serving
time on death row.
Mental incompetende may now be reversible through the use of
psychotropic medications." The restoration of competency through
artificial means in order to execute a death row inmate is the controversial
issue addressed in this Comment. The United States Supreme Court in
Ford v. Wainright held that an individual may not be executed if he or
she is deemed incompetent. The Court did not define competency. Four
years later, the court held in Washington v. Harper14 that an inmate could
be involuntarily medicated in compliance with limits set forth by the
7. Maria L. Ganga, Inmate Poses Ethic Problem for Doctors, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1998, at 2-3.
8. Id. at 1.
9. This ethical dilemma faced by physicians and psychiatrists will be discussed
in more detail later in the comment. See infra, Section I.D.
10. Kim Cobb, Arizona Seeks a 'Hired Gun' to Treat Killer/Inmate's Mental
Illness pits Law against Medical Ethics, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 25, 1999, at 2.
11. David H. Schwartz, Doctors, lawyers clash over death-row case issue in
Arizona: Should inmate's mental competency be restored so he may be Executed,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MON., Aug. 19, 1999, at 1.
12. Psychotropic drugs are defined as any medication including sedatives,
tranquilizers, hypnotics, and antipsychotic drugs. Thomas G. Guntheil & Paul S.
Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and
Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12
HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 79 (1983).
13. Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
14. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
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Court. Again, the Court did not focus on the definition of competency.
Until the Supreme Court clarifies whether competency achieved through
medication is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of Ford, the legal and
medical fields will continue to grapple with the issue. Forcible medication
would be used solely for the purpose of executing death row inmates
within the boundaries of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.15
This Comment examines the role that medical ethics plays in
determining whether artificial competence, restored through the use of
psychotropic medication treatments is sufficient to fulfill the rule of Ford.
First, this Comment examines the background of this debate by discussing
16the three most relevant cases: Ford, Washington and Perry v. Louisiana.
Next this Comment analyzes the present dilemma of whether, in light of
Supreme Court precedent, death row inmates may be forced to take
psychotropic medications in order to be executed. The Comment then
discusses the role that psychiatrists play in the execution process and the
implications of that participation in light of the Hippocratic Oath, as well
as American Psychiatric Association Ethical Guidelines. 7 Finally, this
Comment examines the views of the medical and legal communities
concerning this dilemma, absent Supreme Court guidance, and proposes a
compromise between the medical and legal communities.
I. PRIOR HISTORY
A. Ford v. Wainright
Ford serves as the backdrop to the dilemma now facing courts,
attorneys and doctors. 8 The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Marshall, held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
States from inflicting death on an inmate who is insane. 9 This holding
affirmed the common law practice, which had been followed since the
thirteenth century.2 While at common law the "insane" could not be put
15. The 8th Amendment states that "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
16. Perry v. Louisiana, 543 So. 2d 487 (La. 1989).
17. Hippocrates, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 647 (4th Unabridged
Lawyer's ed. 1996) (hereinafter "STEDMAN'S").
18. Ford, 477 U.S. 399.
19. See generally, id.
20. "For centuries no jurisdiction has countenanced the execution of the
insane, yet this Court has never decided whether the Constitution forbids the
2001]
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to death, the definition of "insane" was unclear. 2' The Court stated that
for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, it would examine whether the
prisoner was aware of his pending execution and the reason he was being
22 2put to death . There are several rationales for the Court's holding." The
first and most persuasive argument is that the execution of the insane
offends our nation's general notions of humanity and dignity.24
The second rationale is based on the theory of retribution. According
to this theory, a heinous crime deserves an equally heinous punishment.
A death sentence for certain types of murder or other serious crimes
achieves society's wish to make the criminal suffer for what he or she has
done. This outcome is not achieved if the prisoner does not understand
that he or she is condemned to die." There is no suffering for what he or
she has done because he or she may not comprehend the punishment that
26he or she is about to endure.
A third rationale, found in religion, is that a prisoner who is unable to
comprehend that he is going to die cannot make his peace with God and
prepare for his death2 7 Our country's traditional emphasis on religious
values and practices have made this rationale a root value of our society.
A more modern rationale is that the execution of the incompetent does
not serve as a deterrent. The deterrence theory holds that killing an
practice. Today we keep faith with our common-law heritage in holding that it
does." See id.
21. Very often the term insane is used interchangeably with incompetent.
However, the definition of competency will be discussed later in the Comment
and the difference from insanity will be more clearly explained.
22. Ford, 477 U.S. at 399.
23. These various justifications will only be touched on briefly in this
Comment, but they provide an interesting look into the interactive role of
medicine and their view of capital punishment in general as well as society's
rationale in support of and against the death penalty.
24. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell,
Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 384
(1962).
25. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 24, at 386.
26. It is important to note that although these inmates may not be "suffering"
in the sense that society would wish, the suffering that they endure on a daily basis
as the result of their mental illness is very real and very painful.
27. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 24, at 387.
28. Roberta M. Harding, "End Game": Competency and the Execution of
Condemned Inmates-A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition
Against the Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. Louis U. PuB. L.
REV. 105, 111 (1994); Rhonda K. Jenkins, Fit to Die: Drug-Induced Competency
for the Purpose of Execution. 20 S. ILL. U. L. J. 149 (1995).
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incompetent person will not effectively deter others from committing the
same crime. This rationale is best summarized in the following statement:
"[U]nless that death serves to deter others from committing the same
crime ... there is no deterrent value in executing the insane person, so
that his life may be spared without weakening the deterrent effect of the
death penalty."29 Sir Edward Coke vehemently supported this rationale
and stated that "by intendment of Law the execution of the offender is for
example, ... but so it is not when a mad man is executed, but should be a
miserable spectacle, both against Law, and of [extreme] inhumanity and
cruelty, and can be no example to others."3° These rationales were set
forth in Ford, supporting the holding that the incompetent should not be
executed.
A final rationale is the evolutionary nature of that which is considered
decent. In Trop v. Dulles, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the Eighth
Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."31 The Trop Court
explained that as society changes, so do the views of what it finds
acceptable. The Court examined the idea that, despite a historical
acceptance of execution in our nation, there could come a day when
society evolved to the point of finding such punishment unacceptable.
Furthermore, this would also include the likelihood that the execution of
certain classes of individuals or the use of certain methods of execution
could be found unacceptable." This reasoning extends to the present
holding of Ford, which prohibits the execution of the incompetent.
B. Washington v. Harper
The holding of Ford was complicated by a subsequent U.S. Supreme
Court case, Washington.33 In Washington, the Court held that a prisoner
can be medicated involuntarily if the inmate has a serious mental illness
and "is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in his medical
interest."' 34 In this case the Court was examining a prison policy that
governed procedures prior to the involuntary medication of prisoners."
The Court evaluated whether the procedures complied with both the
29. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 24, at 384-385.
30. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986) (citing 3 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)).
31. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
32. See id.
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substantive and procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.36 The Court followed its previous holding in
Turner v. Safely,37 stating that in order to uphold the prison's policy there
would have to be a showing of "reasonableness" with regard to the
policy."
The Court based its finding of "reasonableness" on three factors.39 The
first factor was that "there must be a valid, rational connection between
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it." °  Second, the Court considered "the impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards
and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally."41
The third factor was "the absence of ready alternatives., 42 This last
consideration exhibited that the lack of alternative means for controlling
the prisoner's behavior, aside from the proposed regulation, would result
in evidence of reasonableness on the part of the prison regulation.43
In Washington, the governmental interest was to protect the other
inmates, guards and the prisoner himself from the actions he might take as
a result of his mental illness." The Court found that this was a legitimate
governmental interest and that it comported with the other requirements
of reasonableness set forth above.45 Although the Court found that the
prisoner had a liberty interest in remaining free from involuntary
medication, this interest was outweighed by the government's interest in
protecting the prison population, as well as the prisoner himself.
46
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
37. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
38. Washington, 494 U.S. at 223 (citing Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
Turner considered various factors to determine the reasonableness of a challenged
prison regulation.
39. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78-79. Other factors were considered in Turner, but
only three were relevant in Washington.
40. Washington, 494 U.S. at 224 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; quoting Block
v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
41. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
42. Id. at 90-91.
43. This is not to say that the prison is responsible for coming up with every
possible alternative to the regulation. Nor does the prison have to eliminate all
alternatives before establishing reasonableness. This factor is merely a part of
what can contribute to the evidence of reasonableness, necessary to be proven by
the prison. Id.
44. 494 U.S. at 226.
45. Id. at 228.
46. Id.
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The public policy rationales inherent in Washington ensure that prison
officials can operate their institutions without limits on their ability to
maintain safety in the prison setting.47 It is important to note, however,
that the Court emphasized that the administration of such drugs to
inmates must be in their "best medical interest."48 The Court stated that
"the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who
has a serious mental illness with anti-psychotic drugs against his will, if the
inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the
inmate's medical interest.
4 9
Washington involved the administration of psychotropic medications to
inmates who were not condemned to die. ° As a result, the Court did not
address whether its holding could be extended to allow for the forcible
medication of condemned prisoners. Such an extension could result in the
allowance of involuntary medication of inmates for the specific purpose of
returning them to competency in order to execute them. 1 Although this
issue was not addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court, it has been addressed
by the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Perry 2
C. Perry v. Louisiana
Michael Owen Perry was condemned to die for murdering his mother,
father and three other family members. 3 Perry was found in a D.C. hotel
room with seven television sets. Upon each set he had drawn eyes and
written the name of one of his seven victims." He was diagnosed as a
paranoid schizophrenic prior to the murders and had exhibited a long
history of schizophrenic behaviors, including an obsession with the singer
Olivia Newton John.5 This diagnosis raised questions about Mr. Perry's
47. Keith Alan Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic
Drugs, 47 ARK. L. REV. 361, 381 (1994).
48. 494 U.S. at 210, 227 (1990).
49. Id.
50. This is the primary difference that distinguishes Washington from Perry.
51. The Supreme Court did not touch on this issue. If the court ruled that
competency could be sufficient in the eyes of Ford, even if attained artificially,
many prisoners who are mentally ill and incompetent would be killed as the result
of a technicality achieved through modern science.
52. 543 So. 2d 487 (La. 1989).
53. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d. 746, 748 (La. 1992).
54. Id. at 747.
55. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV-TR, supra note
1, at 314. Paranoid schizophrenia is a type of schizophrenia in which the
following criteria are met: (A) Preoccupation with one or more delusions or
frequent auditory hallucinations and (B) None of the following is prominent:
20011
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competency to be executed within the boundaries of the Eighth
Amendment.
The Louisiana Supreme Court faced the question that had not been
56addressed in Washington. The Court considered two issues. The first
was whether the state may forcibly medicate a prisoner in order to restore
his competency for execution." The second was whether chemically-
induced competency is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of Ford." The
Louisiana Supreme Court chose to address only the first issue." It ruled
that an inmate could not be forced to take psychotropic medications
exclusively for the purpose of execution. It found that Mr. Perry had
been medicated for no other reason than to prepare him for execution, in
direct contradiction of Washington's requirement that the forcible
medication of inmates must be in their "best medical interest."61
Furthermore, the Court in Washington explained in dicta that the
administration of psychotropic medications must be for the purpose of
• 62
treatment, and not for alternate rationales such as punishment.
The court in Perry recognized that legitimate and sufficient
governmental interest existed to override Perry's liberty interest in
63avoiding forced medication. Specifically, the court stated that the
"state's interest in carrying out the death penalty did not justify the
intrusion of medication into Perry's mind and body." ' The court upheld
the liberty interest of the inmate, resulting in the protection of prisoners
who are not competent to be executed. The ruling attempted to limit the
scope of Washington, thus protecting incompetent inmates from being
executed in violation of the Eighth Amendment with the aid of modern
medications.
One problem remains in the wake of Perry. The Louisiana Supreme
Court did not rule on the issue of sufficiency of chemically induced
disorganized speech, disorganized or catatonic behavior, or flat or inappropriate
affect.
56. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
57. Kristen Wenstrup Crosby, State v. Perry: Louisiana's Cure-to-Kill Scheme
Forces Death-Row Inmates to Choose Between A Life Sentence of Untreated
Insanity and Execution, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1993).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Perry, 610 So. 2d. at 771 (La. 1992).
61. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
62. Id.
63. Perry, 610 So. 2d. 746.
64. Id.
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competency within the boundaries of Ford.65 Accordingly, the holding in
Perry only applies to those inmates who are medicated with no other
prison or governmental interest than to restore competency for
execution. 66 This leaves open the issue whether inmates may be treated
when there is another governmental interest present in addition to that of
executing the inmate. For example, this situation could occur when an
inmate poses a threat to himself or to the rest of the prison population.
The question would then become whether that inmate's liberty interest
still overrides the government's interest. Since this issue is left untouched
by Perry, another court could read Ford broadly, and find that a state
could forcibly medicate an inmate on death row if that medication is
reasonably related to a legitimate state interest in punishing prisoners and
the treatment serves the medical interests of the inmate. 6
D. Technical Dilemmas Faced by the Medical Community
Despite the shortcomings of Perry, it is presently the only case law
protecting the liberty interest of death row inmates. Against the
backdrop of Ford, Washington and Perry, the medical field must now look
to the current dilemmas that define this controversial issue. The primary
issue, outside of the legal realm, is the ethical dilemma facing psychiatrists
and physicians who are bound by the Hippocratic Oath, which states:
I swear by Apollo the physician, by Aesculapius, Hygeia, and
Panacea, and I take to witness all the gods, all the goddesses, to
keep according to my ability and my judgment the following
Oath ... I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients
according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to
anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor
give advice, which may cause his death ... I will preserve the
purity of my life and my art ... In every house where I come I
will enter only for the good of my patients, keeping myself far
68from all intentional ill-doing.
This oath indicates that doctors face an ethical dilemma when deciding
whether to assist in the diagnosis and treatment of inmates whom they
know are being treated to restore them to competency for execution. The
difficult task psychiatrists face in defining competency further complicates
this issue. Ultimately, the decision concerning competency rests with the
forensic psychiatrists who are in the precarious position of acting as
65. Crosby, supra note 57, at 1195.
66. Id. at 1195.
67. Id. at 1210.
68. Hippocrates, supra note 17.
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agents of the state, while they are still bound by the oath they took to
protect their patients."
The role of the forensic psychiatrist is often one of both doctor and
agent of the state.70 The forensic psychiatrist is responsible for evaluating
inmates at various stages of the judicial process, each stage presenting the
doctor with a different task.7' Psychiatrists are often called upon to
determine whether defendants are competent to stand trial. 72 They also
are responsible for determining whether convicts are competent to be
executed. The latter role will be discussed in detail in the remainder of
this Comment.
73
In order to understand the role that forensic psychiatrists play, it is
important to consider some of the complexities of their tasks. One of the
most perplexing difficulties facing these doctors, as well as the courts, is
the definition of competency.74 It is important to recognize that
competency for execution is not the same as competency to stand trial.
Competency for execution describes one's mental capacity at the time of
execution and not at the time of the crime, or at the time of the trial.75
The definition of competency established under Ford is one of many
attempts to determine whether an individual is competent to die and
69. The question has been raised whether forensic psychiatrists are actually
acting in a medical capacity, or whether they are merely acting as agents of the
state. If it is found that they are not acting in a medical capacity, then they are no
longer bound by the ethical guidelines of the Hippocratic Oath. Alfred M.
Freedman M.D. and Abraham L. Halpern, M.D., The Erosion of Ethics and
Morality in Medicine: Physician Participation in Legal Executions in the United
States. 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 169 (1996).
70. Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and
Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 78 (1986).
71. Id. at 70.
72. Id.
73. The role of psychiatrists in determining competency to stand trial is
outside the scope of this Comment. An analogy has been made between the two
roles psychiatrists play and the ethics involved. However, the analogy is flawed, in
part due to the fact that the finality of death that results from the latter role
presents a much more precarious ethical choice on the part of the psychiatrist who
deems an inmate competent to be put to death.
74. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). Competent is defined as "duly
qualified; answering all requirements; having sufficient capacity, ability or
authority; possessing the requisite physical, mental, natural or legal qualifications;
able; adequate; suitable; sufficient." Id.
75. Byers, supra note 47 (quoting Robert F. Shcopp, Wake Up and Die Right.
The Rationale, Standard, and Jurisprudential Significance of the Competency to
Face Execution Requirement, 51 LA. L. REV. 995, 1001 (1991)).
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whether he is protected under the Eighth Amendment.76 The Court in
Ford found that an inmate was competent to be executed in accordance
with the Eighth Amendment if "he is aware of his impending execution
and understands the reason for imposition of the punishment."" This was
essentially the same definition as the common law definition of sanity."
States have employed numerous other definitions of sanity or insanity,
varying from the common law approach to a combination of the Ford test
and other additions. 9 Some states have adopted a standard that requires
that the prisoner recognize the nature of his sentence and why it is so, and
that he has the capacity to understand any facts that could render the
sentence unjust. This standard ensures that he is able to defend himself or
obtain aid in his defense." From the disparity among the states'
definitions of insanity and competency, there arises a problem of
continuity in diagnoses.
In an attempt to create continuity across state lines, giving psychiatrists
more guidance in their evaluations of inmates, the American Bar
Association (ABA) set forth a two-prong test for establishing competency
for execution. 82  This test presents the evaluator with an either-or
scenario. If the inmate fits into either of the categories of the two-prong
test he is deemed incompetent and therefore unfit for execution.83 The
first prong is cognitive and reflects the Ford test.84 It states that an inmate
is incompetent to be executed if "as a result of mental illness or mental
retardation, the convict cannot understand the nature of the pending
proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason for the punishment,
76. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 399.
77. Jenkins, supra note 28, at 167.
78. Id. It is only natural that the Court would adopt the common law
definition, since the holding of the Court in Ford based its holding on the practice
at common law.
79. Byers, supra note 47 (quoting Barbara A. Ward, Competency for
Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 54 (1986)).
80. Ward, supra note 70, at 60-61.
81. Since doctors are basing their clinical judgments on the given state's
definition of competency or insanity, there is a great range of diagnoses and
outcomes across state lines. This raises issues of whether inmates' liberty interests
are being protected in the best manner.
82. Jenkins, supra note 28, at 167.
83. It is unclear whether he is unable to be executed altogether, or whether a
stay will be granted until the time the prisoner regains competency. States have
approached this issue in different ways.
84. Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d. 53, 55-56 (S.C. 1993); Jenkins supra note 28
at 168.
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or the nature of the punishment.
8 1
The second prong is the "assistance prong." 86 It states that an inmate is
incompetent if "as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the
convict lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or understand any fact that
might exist which would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks
the ability to convey such information to counsel or to the court. 8 7
The ABA standards would, if followed, afford mentally ill death row
inmates an increased amount of protection for two reasons. First, there
would be an increase in uniformity across states and psychiatrists with
regard to diagnosis and treatment. Second, the addition of the "assistance
prong" would force a more stringent review of capacity than the broadly
read standard of the Ford Court. 8 Although this ABA standard provides
89
states with a uniform definition, the Supreme Court has not determined
whether chemically-induced competency fits within the accepted
definitions of competency. Until it does, the issue remains a subjective
one for the forensic psychiatrist determining an inmate's mental status.90
II. LEGAL AND MEDICAL ETHICAL DILEMMAS
Forensic psychiatrists face technical challenges in evaluating prisoners
facing death because they are working with inconsistent definitions of
competency and insanity. Furthermore, the definitions established under
the common law and by the ABA often deal with legal requirements
85. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-5.6 (b) (1987).
86. Jenkins, supra note 28, at 168.
87. ABA, supra note 85.
88. Jenkins, supra note 28, at 168.
89. Two commentators have proposed a number of questions, which may be
used in determining competency:
(1) Does the prisoner know he is in a state or federal prison? (2) Does he
understand that he is incarcerated because he was convicted of a
particular crime? (3) Does he understand that he was sentenced to death
because of his conviction and this sentence is about to be carried out? (4)
Does the prisoner know.., his attorney's name? (5) Is he aware that the
attorney serves as his advocate in the legal system?
Mark A. Small & Randy K. Otto, Evaluations of Competency to be Executed, 18
CRIM JUST. & BEHAV. 146, 147, 156-57 n.2 (1991).
90. The other problem that arises as a result of this subjectivity, is the
inconsistent application of the death penalty. This result can have numerous
effects on the criminal justice system, including a decreased lack of confidence in
the system. This, along with the infringement on liberty interests of those inmates
who may be victims of the subjective nature of system, remains an area of concern
until the Supreme Court settles the issue.
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alone, and ignore medical rationales." What is often overlooked, by the
legal community, is the fact that forensic psychiatrists are doctors. They
take an oath, which obliges them to act in the best interest of their
patients92 and above all "to do no harm and take no life." 93  This
complicates their participation in the treatment of inmates who will
ultimately be executed as a result of such treatment. When a psychiatrist
evaluates a death row inmate, finds him incompetent and proceeds to
treat him with psychotropic medications, against the inmate's will, the
psychiatrist becomes a "but-for cause" of that inmate's death. If the
psychiatrist did not prescribe the medications, the inmate would not
become "competent" and therefore could not be executed under the
Eighth Amendment.94 This constitutes an ethical violation within the
medical community.
A. The Role of the Psychiatrist in Capital Cases
The role that psychiatrists play in capital punishment is twofold. First,
they must evaluate inmates to determine whether they are competent to
be executed. 95  Second, if they determine that the inmate is legally
incompetent, they must decide whether to treat the mental incompetence
with psychotropic medication.96
Psychotropic medications are drugs that affect a patient's thinking and
ability to communicate. 7 These drugs have been used as the primary
method of combating mental illness since the 1950s. 98 They diminish
symptoms of mental illness by altering the chemical balance in the brain,
resulting in a clearer thought process.""
91. Medical doctors are trying to make evaluations about a patient's mental
health, a medical condition. Often the definitions that are adapted by lawyers and
judges focus entirely on legalisms to maintain constitutionality. While this a
necessary aspect of the definition of competency, the result may be a definition,
which is not as workable in a medical setting.
92. Hippocrates, supra note 68, at 716-17.
93. Rochelle G. Salguero, Medical Ethic and Competency to Be Executed, 96
YALE L.J. 167, 168 (1986).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
95. Byers, supra note 47, at 382.
96. Id. at 383.
97. These drugs can include sedatives, hypnotics, antipsychotics, and
tranquilizers. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 79.
98. Nancy S. Horton, Restoration of Competency for Execution: Furiosus Solo
Furore Punitur, 44 S.W. L. J. 1191, 1204 (1990).
99. Byers, supra note 47, at 376-77 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. at
214.).
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The subsets of psychotropic medications that are most often used on
death row inmates are antipsychotics. Two factors explain this choice of
treatment. First, most of the mentally ill inmates on death row suffer from
psychosis'°° or some form of schizophrenia." Second, these disorders are
treated with great success by antipsychotic medications, such as Haldol,
Thorazine, and Mellaril. These drugs benefit enormously those persons
suffering from mental illness, because the drugs eliminate the need for
extensive use of mechanical restraints or seclusion as a method of
controlling patients.'03
However, these drugs do not offer a cure to patients. It is well-
recognized in the medical field that although the drugs treat the symptoms
of mental illness quite effectively, they do not cure the underlying
illness.'04 Since anti-psychotic drugs offer only temporary treatment for
symptoms of the disorder and not a cure, it is important to consider
whether inmates treated with these medications are actually competent or
whether they are merely "synthetically sane" or "chemically competent."
These terms describe the treatment of inmates, who are facing death.
Drugs provide mentally ill inmates with a cognitive clarity that they are
not capable of achieving without the medication. The question remains,
however, whether this newfound clarity and rationality constitutes
competency under the Eighth Amendment.'O
Ethical dilemmas are always complicated due to their theoretical
nature. Everyone faces various ethical choices in life, but doctors and
lawyers are challenged by serious ethical issues on a daily basis. As a part
of their profession, they swear to uphold oaths to act in accordance with
ethical guidelines set forth by their respective occupations. Doctors take
the Hippocratic Oath and swear to never "prescribe a deadly drug" and to
"preserve the purity of life."'' 7 When treating an inmate who has been
100. Psychotic disorders generally involve problems with perception, thinking
and cognitive processes. The patient will often suffer from hallucination and/or
delusions. Michelle K. Banchand, Note, Antipsychotic Drugs and the Incompetent
Defendant: A Perspective on the Treatment and Prosecution of Incompetent
Defendants, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1059, 1060-61 (1990).
101. Horton, supra note 98, at 1204.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Byers, supra note 47, at 377.
105. See generally Guntheil & Appelbaum, supra note 12.
106. This issue was discussed in more detail previously, however, it is a
natural question that arises from the discussion of medicating inmates that are
facing death, as soon as they are restored to competency.
107. Hippocrates, supra note 68, at 716-17.
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condemned to die, physicians are concerned that they will be participating
in the execution process.' 8 Many commentators have addressed this issue
and declared that the participation of psychiatrists in treating these
prisoners is not unethical because they are serving justice. °
Many doctors have responded to this argument by stating that they are
not aiding justice because the sentence has already been handed down." °
The medical community has made its response clear through the ethics
guidelines set forth by the American Psychiatric Association (APA)"' and
the American Medical Association (AMA)." These organizations have
denounced the participation of doctors in the diagnosis and treatment of
inmates condemned to death."3 The medical community is frustrated by
attempts of the legal community to compel physicians to treat these
inmates. They argue that the practice of treating these condemned
inmates is contrary to the goals of medicine, and that psychiatrists should
not participate in the execution of these inmates.
B. Policy of the Medical Community Regarding the Treatment of
Condemned Inmates
What is the official policy of the medical community? The answer is
found in a variety of documents within the medical field. The disapproval
of this practice by psychiatrists is rooted in the Hippocratic Oath as well
as in the guidelines set forth by the AMA.1
4
The changing ethical standards in the practice of medicine and
psychiatry are exemplified a 1995 AMA report, Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs (CEJA)."5 The CEJA report was compiled with input
108. Byers, supra note 47, at 384.
109. Id. at 385.
110. Robert D. Miller, Evaluation of the Treatment to Competency to be
Executed: A National Survey and an Analysis, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 67, 74
(Spring 1988) (citing Paul S. Appelbaum, et al., Resolved: It is Unethical for
Psychiatrists to Diagnose or Treat Condemned Persons in Order to Determine
Their Competency to Be Executed, debate presented at the Annual Scientific
Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, Chicago, May 13, 1987).
111. A national organization comprised of approximately 35,000 physicians.
Paradon: Healing to Execute; Insane Man to Get Louisiana Rehearing, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Mar. 17, 1991, at Al.
112. A private organization comprised of approximately greater than 280,000
doctors and medical students. Id.
113. Id.
114. Council Report: Physician Participation in Capital Punishment, 270
JAMA 365, 368 (1993).
115. Id.
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from both the AMA and the APA."' The APA, however, did not have
much input in the final draft of the report, which ultimately became
policy.117 This explains why the AMA-CEJA report does not reflect the
general consensus of the APA and specifically, those psychiatrists who are
ultimately responsible for performing the evaluations on these inmates.
A previous AMA-CEJA report prohibited the participation of
physicians "in any aspect of capital punishment.". This prohibition was a
result of the opinion within the medical field that doctors were committed
to the protection of their patients and that they must not do any harm to
them.1 9 This prohibition extended to doctors who were asked to save the
lives of suicidal inmates just so they could be executed. The question
was raised, however, whether this prohibition extended to psychiatrists
who were asked to treat individuals with psychotropic medications in
order to allow them to be executed.
The answer to this question is found in other documents, such as the
AMA's Code of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions, 21 which states that "a
physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when
there is hope of doing so, should not be a participant in a legally
authorized execution."1 22 Another example of the APA's disapproval of
this practice is found in a document issued by its Board of Trustees. This
document states that "the physician's serving the state as an executioner,
either directly or indirectly, is a perversion of medical ethics and of his or
her role as healer and comforter., 123 Finally, every edition of the APA's
Principles of Medical Ethics With Annotations Especially Applicable to
Psychiatry1 24 includes a section stating that "a psychiatrist should not be a
116. Although this document did have input from the APA, it was not
reviewed by the APA Board of Trustees or the APA assembly. Paul S.
Appelbaum, M.D., The Council on Psychiatry and Law, 151 Am. J. Psychiatry 323
(1994).
117. Id.
118. See generally Appelbaum, supra note 116.
119. Physicians are committed to the ethical guideline of ethos primum non
nocere or "first, do not harm." Id. at 365.
120. Condemned Inmate Overdoses, Is Revived and Then Executed,
MAMARONECK DAILY TIMES (N.Y.), Aug. 8, 1995, at 3A.
121. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Code of
Medical Ethics: Current Opinions § 2.06 (1992).
122. Id.
123. Freedman & Halpern, supra note 69, at 174.
124. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, PRINCIPLES of MEDICAL ETHICS WITH
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE to PSYCHIATRY (1995).
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participant in a legally authorized execution.' ' 125 These documents clearly
demonstrate the disapproval of the psychiatric community regarding
psychiatric participation in treating inmates condemned to death.
Why, then, does the 1995 CEJA report ignore all of these views and
state that it is ethical for psychiatrists to participate in the treatment of
death row inmates for the purpose of restoring them to competence for
execution? 126 One reason is that the report provides for a psychiatrist's
exemption, which greatly limits his or her participation."' The
psychiatrist's role in the treatment of condemned inmates is limited to
passive participation. The doctors were only to treat the inmates in a
manner that controlled their illness but did not restore them to legal
competency.12 Restoring competency would deliver inmates to death and
would constitute active participation in the execution of the condemned
prisoner.
This compromise, however, was not adequate to deal with the
contradictory nature of the AMA-CEJA report and the standards of the
APA, so further drafting incorporated the opinions of the APA1 29 The
result of the redrafting was a new CEJA report, approved by the AMA,
which still did not treat the issue of psychiatric participation in any
detail. a The failure of the CEJA report to take the views of the APA in
account is of great concern to those in the medical field who are facing
this dilemma. The report departs greatly from the historical principles
that have been followed by the medical community. 3' Additionally, the
report omitted any mention of the Principles of Medical Ethics With
Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry, which states the clear
policy of the APA that psychiatrists should not participate in capital
punishment. The regulation of this issue should be established by a group
of professionals practicing in the field. The new CEJA report does
nothing more than represent a widening schism of ethical standards within
the medical community.
32
Furthermore, this report promotes the view that the doctor is the agent
125. Id.
126. CEJA REPORT, supra note 114, at 1-2.
127. This was a result of the concerns that were voiced by the APA.
Applebaum, supra note 116.
128. CEJA REPORT, supra note 114, at 368.
129. Freedman & Halpern, supra note 69, at 177.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 178.
132. Id. at 169.
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of the state and ignores the fact that doctors are doctors first."' In the
context of treating condemned inmates to restore competency, a doctor
cannot act as an agent of the state and still maintain his ethical duty as a
doctor to preserve life. This presupposes that forensic psychiatrists are
able to separate their roles as doctors and act in a non-medical capacity
when performing evaluations on behalf of the state.14 This is not a
reasonable expectation. Doctors, whether physicians or forensic
psychiatrists, are trained to treat medical problems. Naturally, they are to
act in the best interest of their patients' medical needs. This is not a role
that a doctor can relinquish when faced with treating an inmate who could
lose his life as a result of the doctor's evaluation.
The view that forensic psychiatrists are acting outside the scope of a
medical role135 is an attempt to bypass the ethical guidelines that would
result in the protection of inmates suffering from mental illnesses. It
would also result in further inconsistency in applying the death penalty.
There would be an increased number of inmates put to death while still
suffering from mental illness. Ultimately, more inmates would be put to
death in violation of the Eighth Amendment."'
Organizations such as the American College of Physicians, Human
Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, and the National Coalition
to Abolish the Death Penalty agree with the argument set forth above.
These organizations do not accept claims that forensic psychiatrists are
not acting in a medical role. They state "this claim ignores the reality that
forensic practitioners... are physicians in the eyes of the public, the
courts, and even their examinees. '37 This is a standard behind which
doctors stand. The medical community argues that the preservation of
life, which it swears to uphold, in the Hippocratic Oath must come first.
The legal community supports the opposing view, that the furtherance of
justice requires the cooperation of doctors to treat these individuals, both
for the inmate's well-being and for the fulfillment of the sentence under
the law. This debate continues to flourish, creating the need for a
compromise between the medical and legal communities.
133. CEJA REPORT, supra note 114, at 368.
134. Paul S. Appelbaum, The Parable of the Forensic Psychiatrist: Ethics and
the Problem of Doing Harm, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249, 252-54 (1990).
135. Id. at 252-54.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
137. AMERICAN COLLEGE of PHYSICIANS et. al., BREACH OF TRUST:
PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 44 (1994).
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III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
It is argued by professionals that, although the ethical guidelines are
blurring, there are no alternatives other than psychotropic medication to
dealing with these inmates.1 8 It has been proposed that inmates who are
found incompetent should have their death sentences commuted to life
imprisonment." 9 Others contend that the inmates should be treated only
to prevent them from presenting a danger to themselves or other people,
but not to make them competent for purposes of being executed. 14°
Finally, others believe that inmates should have the right to refuse
treatment, but if they do regain competency, they may be executed at that
time. Of these alternatives, the first has been enacted by statute.
Maryland has legislated that at the time an inmate is found
incompetent for execution, his or her death sentence is commuted to life
imprisonment.42 This statute allows for the execution of an inmate who is
found competent, whether he or she is only competent through chemical
means, or naturally. 143 However, the statute provides that if the prisoner is
found to be incompetent, the sentence must be commuted to life
imprisonment, at which time the inmate may no longer be involuntarily
medicated.'" Maryland's statute strikes a compromise, which allows for
the protection of the inmate's rights while still assuring that those
individuals who are deemed competent, whether artificially or naturally,




The dilemma of death row inmates developing mental illness and
becoming incompetent is not disappearing, but will continue to increase. 46
138. The alternative will only be touched on briefly, but further discussion of
this topic would provide for an increased understanding of how to manage these
inmates.
139. Horton, supra note 98, at 1225.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. "An inmate is not incompetent merely because his or her competence is
dependent upon continuing treatment, including the user of medication." Md.
Ann. Code art. 27, § 75A(a)(2)(ii) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
143. See Horton, supra note 98, at 1218.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1219.
146. There are cases facing the courts which deal with this exact issue,
including the case of Claude Eric Maturana, a death row inmate whose doctors at
20011
734 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 17:715
This increase will likely result from improvements in the ability to treat
and reverse illness through the use of medications.
In addition, these inmates are at the mercy of the prison and justice
systems, which are attempting to decide for them whether they should
receive psychotropic medications to treat their disorders. The systems
making these decisions are not always putting prisoners on these drugs for
their "best medical interest"'147 as is required, but often they are
medicating these inmates in order to render them competent to be
executed.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, 48 the legal
and medical communities are left to struggle with not only the legal
ramifications of medicating inmates against their will, and ultimately
putting them to death as a result of such medications, but with the ethical
ramifications.49 It is important to hold doctors and psychiatrists to the
oaths that they take"O and the guidelines they swear to live by. "' In
addition, psychotropic medications do not cure mental illnesses but
merely treat the symptoms and create a "mask of sanity.', 2 Courts must
recognize that more is required to protect the Eighth Amendment rights
of those inmates who suffer from mental illness.
The introduction of this Comment spoke of the dilemma the state of
Arizona is presently facing with regard to Claude Eric Maturana"' Mr.
Maturana was sentenced to die for the murder of a sixteen year-old boy.)
Mr. Maturana was diagnosed with schizophrenia and is barely able to
communicate with his attorney.' He was sent to the Arizona State
Hospital to be restored to competence but the hospital staff has refused to
treat him, stating that it would be a violation of medical ethics.5 6 The
Arizona attorney general's office has threatened to hold the doctors at the
hospital in contempt if they do not comply and treat Mr. Maturana. The
hospital's Chief of Staff, Jack Silver, stated that "if it gets to that point, ...
the Arizona State Hospital are refusing to treat him, on the grounds that they feel
it is unethical to participate in legalized executions.
147. Washington v. Harper, 494 US. 210, 227 (1990).
148. Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399,399 (1986).
149. Freedman & Halpern, supra note 69.
150. STEDMAN'S, supra note 17.
151. CEJA REPORT, supra note 114, at 368.
152. Horton, supra note 98, at 1204.





the question becomes: Do ethics supersede law or does law supersede
ethics?"'57 This is the question that ultimately remains until the Supreme
Court rules on the issue. Even after that, the question may still remain.
One must ask, however, whether we as a society are prepared to force
doctors to violate their codes of ethics and participate in the killing of
individuals who may not even understand their fate as prisoners
condemned to death.
157. Id.
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